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STRONG BUT SIDELINED: A CALL FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF THE CONTACT SPORT
EXCEPTION THROUGH THE LENS OF TITLE
VII’S DISPARATE TREATMENT ANALYSIS
“If we show emotion, we’re called dramatic.
If we want to play against men, we’re nuts.
And if we dream of equal opportunity, delusional.
When we stand for something, we’re unhinged.
When we’re too good, there’s something wrong with us.
And if we get angry, we’re hysterical, irrational, or just being crazy.
But a woman running a marathon was crazy. A woman boxing
was crazy.
A woman dunking? Crazy. Coaching an NBA team? Crazy.
A woman competing in a hijab, changing her sport, landing a
double-cork 1080
or winning 23 grand slams, having a baby and then coming
back for more?
Crazy, crazy, crazy, crazy and crazy.
So, if they want to call you crazy? Fine.
Show them what crazy can do.”1
INTRODUCTION
Society is changing; female involvement is changing. With these
changes must come the removal of historic stereotypes about a
woman’s ability to participate in sports. The notion that women are
inherently weak and delicate has no place in the world of sports,
where some of the strongest females dominate. Gender distinctions
have been largely reduced in employment and the military, yet they
remain prevalent in athletics.2 While employment laws and military
regulations open the doors to women in physically demanding jobs
and the top-ranked combat positions, education laws close the gates to
football fields and rope off the basketball courts from female ath-
1. Dream Crazier (Nike commercial broadcast Feb. 24, 2019).
2. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); see also Tia Ghose, Women in Combat:
Physical Differences May Mean an Uphill Battle, LIFE SCIENCE (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.livesci
ence.com/52998-women-combat-gender-differences.html.
1011
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letes.3 The contact sport exception in Title IX prohibits female ath-
letes from playing contact sports with the opposite sex.4 This policy of
exclusion prevents gender equality in collegiate athletics and must be
rescinded.5
This Comment argues that the legislature must eliminate the con-
tact sport exception from Title IX to effectuate its purpose: to provide
equal opportunity for women in education and educational activities.6
More specifically, this Comment calls for the elimination of the con-
tact sport exception because: (1) the exception relies on generalized
stereotypes about the physical abilities of women and does not ac-
count for their individualized qualifications; (2) the sex of the athlete
does not inhibit her ability to play the sport because sex does not go to
the essence of the contact sport; and (3) the asserted safety rationale is
pretext for the legislature’s intent to protect revenue-producing sports
like men’s football and basketball from female encroachment.
This Comment will briefly discuss the unconstitutionality of the
contact sport exception under an Equal Protection analysis. Then it
will conduct a cross-statutory analysis between Title IX and Title VII
to articulate the inconsistency of the contact sport exception with the
Civil Rights Act as a whole. The cross-statutory analysis is not to be
construed as an alternative litigation strategy for female athletes, but
rather an argument by analogy to support the elimination of the con-
tact sport exception from Title IX.
Part I of this Comment will provide a background on the current
remedial paths for gender discrimination in athletics, including Title
IX and the limitation of the contact sport exception, and the Equal
Protection Clause. Part I will also provide a background on the paral-
lel provisions and statutory analysis of Title VII. Part II of this Com-
ment will continue by analyzing the asserted safety rationale for the
contact sport exception under the Equal Protection Clause and Title
VII to demonstrate the unconstitutionality and inconsistency of this
policy of exclusion. Part III of this Comment will conclude by discuss-
ing the impact of eliminating the contact sport exception from Title
IX. Part III will also discuss the impact of the new “name, image, and
likeness” laws on the ability of a female athlete to utilize this Title VII
analysis to combat the contact sport exception as a form of systemic
disparate treatment against female athletes.
3. Id.; Ghose, supra note 2.
4. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2000).
5. See Lindsay N. Demery, What About the Boys? Sacking the Contact Sports Exemption and
Tackling Gender Discrimination in Athletics, 34 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 373, 390 (2012).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part will look at the current options that female athletes have
in combating sex discrimination in athletics. First, Section A will pro-
vide a historical analysis of Title IX by looking at the legislative his-
tory and the judicial interpretation of the contact sport exception.
After looking at the failed attempts at recourse through Title IX, Sec-
tion B will look at how courts have allowed female athletes to recover
under the Equal Protection Clause. Lastly, Section C will look to Title
VII’s parallel provisions in employment discrimination cases and stat-
utory analysis.
A. Title IX
In 1972, President Richard Nixon signed Title IX of the Education
Amendments into law.7 Title IX bars sex discrimination by education
programs and activities that receive federal funding. The Act states:
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving fed-
eral financial assistance . . . .”8 The Act covers the entire educational
institution and all of its educational activities and programs if any pro-
gram within the entire educational institution receives any federal
funding.9 In other words, virtually all private and public colleges, uni-
versities, and secondary education schools are covered under Title IX.
Title IX is enforced by the U.S. Department of Education and the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR).10 The OCR has the authority to strip
an educational institution of its federal funding for violating Title IX
but has yet to do so.11 In addition to administrative remedies, the Su-
preme Court recognized in Cannon v. University of Chicago that indi-
viduals have an implied private right of action against educational
institutions that violate Title IX.12 Since individual plaintiffs are not
required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a Title IX
suit, most Title IX claims arise from a private action in the courts.13
7. § 1681.
8. § 1681.
9. Ethan Brown, Athletics and Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 10 GEORGETOWN
J. OF GENDER & L., 505, 508 (2009).
10. § 1681.
11. § 1681; Title IX Basics: Breaking Down the Barriers, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., at 13
n.10 https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/BDB07_Ch2.pdf [hereinafter Title IX Basics].
12. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court found that a private right
of action was critical to achieve Congress’s intent “to provide individual citizens effective protec-
tion against [discriminatory] practices.” Id. at 704. See also Title IX Basics, supra note 11, at 23.
13. See infra notes 28–38 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, the Court recognized in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public School that monetary damages are available under Title IX.14
Although Title IX is often used to combat gender discrimination in
sports, the statute itself does not mention sports. In fact, the words
“sports” and “athletics” do not appear anywhere in the statute. The
original intent of Title IX was to promote gender equality in areas
such as enrollment and teaching positions, not to address gender ine-
qualities in athletics.15 The potential expansion of Title IX to athletic
programs sparked debate. The director of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) believed that Title IX would result in
the “possible doom of intercollegiate sports.”16 The NCAA thereafter
implemented extensive lobbying efforts to exempt intercollegiate ath-
letes from Title IX altogether.17 In response to pressure from the
NCAA, Senator John Tower proposed an amendment excluding any
intercollegiate athletic programs that “provide gross receipts or dona-
tions to the institution necessary to support that activity” from Title
IX.18 In other words, the Tower Amendment sought to exclude any
revenue-producing sport from Title IX. During the congressional de-
bate, Senator Tower explicitly stated his desire to protect ticket sales
produced by men’s football and basketball in order to preserve the
viability of those athletic programs.19 Senator Tower further stated
that “[g]rave concern has been expressed that the . . . rules will under-
cut revenue raising sports programs and damage the overall sports
14. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). The Court relied on the well-
established principle that all remedies are presumed to be available to accompany a federal right
of action “unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.” Id. at 66.
15. 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). As the principal Senate sponsor,
Senator Birch Bayh, explained, Title IX was designed to be “a strong and comprehensive mea-
sure [that would] provide women with solid legal protection from the persistent, pernicious dis-
crimination which is serving to perpetuate second-class citizenship for American women.” Id.
See also Diane Marshall-Freeman et al., Title IX’s Three-Prong Test in Athletics, NAT’L SCH. BD.
ASS’N, COUNCIL OF SCH. ATT’YS (2017), https://cdn-files.nsba.org/s3fs-public/09.%20Marshall
Freeman%20Title%20IX%20ThreeProng%20Test.pdf.
16. TITLE IX: THE EVOLUTION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN EDUCATION AND SPORTS, THE
TOWER AMENDMENT, https://90600661.weebly.com/the-tower-amendment.html (quoting Walter
Byers, director of the NCAA) (last visited Apr. 27, 2020).
17. B. Glenn George, Fifty/Fifty: Ending Sex Segregation in School Sports, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
1107, 1113–14 (2002).
18. 120 CONG. REC. 15322–23 (1974).
19. Id. Senator Tower claimed, “I want to emphasize that one of the prime reasons for my
wanting to preserve the revenue base of intercollegiate activities is that it will provide the re-
sources for expanding women’s activities in intercollegiate sports.” However, the clear presence
of pressure from the NCAA immediately prior to this amendment proposal suggests that Sena-
tor Tower simply wanted to prevent Title IX from negatively impacting the revenue-producing
power houses of men’s basketball and football.
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program of the institution.”20 Essentially, the congressional debate
surrounding the Tower Amendment emphasized the legislature’s con-
cern about appeasing the public’s desire to protect men’s basketball
and football from female encroachment.21 The Tower Amendment
failed, however, and Congress adopted the Javits Amendment, which
diverted the enforcement of Title IX’s anti-discrimination require-
ment to the OCR and “directed the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) to prepare implementing regulations for intercol-
legiate athletics, with ‘reasonable provisions concerning the nature of
particular sports.’”22 One of these regulations was the contact sport
exception.
1. The Contact Sport Exception
In 1975, HEW finalized its first set of regulations concerning Title
IX’s applicability to particular sports.23 The 1975 regulations ex-
panded on Title IX by requiring educational institutions to provide an
equal opportunity for both sexes in any “interscholastic, intercollegi-
ate, club or intramural athletics” (the “equal opportunity require-
ment”).24 The regulations provided a ten-factor test of compliance for
this equal opportunity requirement.25 In addition, the regulations ex-
plicitly allowed institutions to create sex-segregated sports teams and
to exclude women from contact sports (the “contact sport exception”)
by providing as follows:
(b) Separate Teams. Notwithstanding the requirement of paragraph
(a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams
for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based
upon competitive skills or the activity involved is a contact sport.
However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a partic-
ular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such
team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for
members of that sex have previously been limited, members of the
excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless
the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part,
contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football,
basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which
involves bodily contact.26
20. Id. at 15323.
21. Id.; George, supra note 17.
22. S. CONF. REP. No 1026, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4271 (1974); George, supra note 17, at 1114.
23. S. CONF. REP. No 1026; George, supra note 17, at 1114.
24. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2000).
25. See § 106.41(c).
26. § 106.41(b) (emphasis added).
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In other words, educational institutions are only required to let
women try out for men’s teams if (1) there is no equivalent women’s
team offered at that educational institution, and (2) the sport is not a
contact sport. Educational institutions, therefore, do not have to per-
mit a qualified female athlete the chance to compete for a spot on a
men’s team if the sport is a contact sport.
Courts have interpreted the contact sport exception as a complete
bar to Title IX liability for any type of gender discrimination in a con-
tact sport.27 A court’s inquiry into discrimination halts once it is deter-
mined that the sport qualifies as a contact sport under Title IX. For
example, the courts in Barnett v. Texas Wrestling Ass’n and Adams v.
Baker held that the schools were free to exclude girls from mixed-
gender wrestling matches without fear of Title IX liability because
wrestling is enumerated in the HEW regulations as a contact sport.28
If the sport does not fall within one of the enumerated contact sports,
the courts have used the language “other sports the purpose or major
activity of which involves bodily contact” as a catchall.29 For example,
the courts in Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League and Wil-
liams v. School District of Bethlehem held that field hockey is a con-
tact sport under the “bodily contact” provision of the contact sport
exception and is thus exempt from Title IX liability.30
The case Mercer v. Duke University was the first and only time that
a court has upheld a Title IX action for gender discrimination in a
contact sport.31 Mercer, an all-state kicker in high school, tried out for
the men’s football team at Duke and made it. She regularly partici-
pated in practices, conditionings, and scrimmages—in one of which
she kicked a game-winning twenty-eight-yard field goal.32 While on
the team, however, Mercer alleged that the coach made several offen-
sive comments toward her, including “asking her why she was inter-
ested in football, wondering why she did not prefer to participate in
beauty pageants rather than football, and suggesting that she sit in the
stands with her boyfriend rather than on the sidelines.”33 Mercer was
subsequently cut from the team.34 She filed suit, alleging that the foot-
27. George, supra note 17, at 1115.
28. 16 F. Supp. 2d 690, 694–95 (N.D. Tex. 1998); 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1503 (D. Kan. 1996).
29. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
30. 768 F. Supp. 951, 955–56 (D.R.I 1991); 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1993).
31. 190 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 645.
33. Id. at 645; Kate Stone Lombardi, SPORTS; A Victory for a Girl Who Loved to Kick, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/22/nyregion/sports-a-victory-for-a-girl-
who-loved-to-kick.html.
34. Mercer, 190 F.3d at 645.
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ball coach excluded her from the team because of her sex.35 Although
football is a contact sport, the court ultimately found that “[o]nce an
institution has allowed a member of one sex to try out for a team
operated by the institution for the other sex in a contact sport, [the
contact sport exception] is simply no longer applicable, and the insti-
tution is subject to the [anti-discrimination clause].”36 Therefore, the
school was required to treat Mercer in a nondiscriminatory manner
once the coach agreed to let Mercer try out for the team. The school
could have avoided liability, however, by simply refusing Mercer the
opportunity to try out for the team—a decision that would have been
protected by the contact sport exception.37
Although Mercer may be viewed as a victory for women in sports,
the case provides educational institutions with a liability loophole. In-
stead of risking liability, educational institutions can simply refuse to
let any female athletes, individually qualified or not, try out for men’s
contact sports. Mercer, therefore, disincentivizes educational institu-
tions from allowing female athletes to try out for a men’s contact sport
team entirely.38
2. Three-Part Test for Compliance
After the 1975 regulations, educational institutions complained
about the ambiguity of the equal opportunity requirement and sought
further advice on how to ensure compliance.39 In an attempt to re-
solve this ambiguity, HEW released the 1979 Policy Interpretation.40
The Policy Interpretation redefined “equal opportunity” and estab-
lished a three-part test to determine whether an institution is in com-
pliance with Title IX.41 The three-part test required educational
institutions to meet one of the following to be in compliance with Title
IX:
(1) show that the school provides athletic opportunities “substan-
tially proportionate” to each sex’s enrollment;
35. Id. (Mercer notes that the coach allowed several less-qualified male walk-on kickers to
remain on the team).
36. Id. at 648.
37. George, supra note 17, at 1122.
38. Id. at 1109.
39. Id. at 1117; Demery, supra note 5, at 379; Tanya E. Dennis, Why Is Your Grass Greener
than Mine? The Need for Legal Reform to Combat Gender Discrimination in Professional Sports,
50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 347, 354 (2016) (In 1978, the Department of Education received merely
100 complaints alleging discrimination in athletics against more than 50 institutions of higher
education.).
40. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979).
41. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
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(2) establish “a history and continuing practice of program expan-
sion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest
and abilities of the members of the sex;” or
(3) demonstrate that “the interests and abilities of the members of
that sex have been fully or effectively accommodated by the present
program.”42
Under the first alternative, the substantial proportionality test, the
number of female athletes must be substantially proportionate to the
number of female students.43 In 1996, the OCR clarified that the num-
ber of teams allotted for each sex should be substantially proportion-
ate if there is a sufficient number of interested and able students and a
sufficient amount of available competition to sustain a viable intercol-
legiate team.44 The substantial proportionality test is often used by
courts as a feasible option.45
The second alternative, the continuing practice and program expan-
sion test, looks at the institution’s history of program expansion as a
response to the developing interests and abilities of female students.46
This second alternative is rarely used because it was intended to give
institutions that had few women’s teams in the 1970s some time for
adjustment.47
The third alternative, the effective accommodation of athletic inter-
ests and abilities test, looks at the different levels of athletic interests
to determine if the imbalanced gender representation in athletes is a
product of impressible discrimination or simply a result of disinter-
est.48 If the educational institution can show that the lack of female
participation in athletics is a result of a lack of interest in sports by
female students, then the disproportionate sexual representation in
sports will not result in a violation of Title IX.49 The 1996 Clarification
emphasized that this third alternative should be considered a more
viable option than case history would suggest.50
42. Id.; George, supra note 17, at 1117.
43. Marshall-Freeman et al., supra note 15, at 10.
44. U.S. DEP’T. OF EDU., OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Pol-
icy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/clarific.html.
45. George, supra note 17, at 1117; Demery, supra note 5, at 381.
46. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 77,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
47. George, supra note 17, at 1117.
48. Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 768 F.3d 843, 858 (9th Cir. 2014).
49. Marshall-Freeman et al., supra note 15, at 13.
50. George, supra note 17, at 1119.
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B. The Equal Protection Clause
While the contact sport exception prevents some athletes from legal
recourse under Title IX, student athletes may be able to bring a claim
for sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.51 The Equal Protection Clause states “[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”52 The Fourteenth Amendment initially dealt with racial
inequality.53 In 1971, the Supreme Court extended Fourteenth
Amendment protection to gender classifications.54 In Reed v. Reed,
the Supreme Court found that when a state actor discriminates on the
basis of gender, the state action is subject to intermediate constitu-
tional scrutiny.55 Since federally funded schools constitute state actors,
the Equal Protection Clause provides student athletes with a cause of
action for gender discrimination.56
This Section will look at the level of intermediate scrutiny applied
to sex discrimination claims established by Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan and United States v. Virginia, and the judicial inter-
pretation of sex discrimination in sports cases like Hoover v.
Meikeljohn, Force v. Pierce, and Adams v. Baker under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.57 Lastly, this Section will point out the limits that Title
IX places on Equal Protection claims.
1. Intermediate Scrutiny
The pivotal case Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan estab-
lished that gender is a quasi-protected class entitled to constitutional
protection under the Equal Protection Clause.58 The Court deter-
mined that classifications based on gender must satisfy intermediate
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (“The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the
States.”). See also Demery, supra note 5, at 390.
54. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74–77 (1971) (court held that the Equal Protection Clause
applied to gender discrimination). See also Demery, supra note 5, at 384.
55. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75–76.
56. Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996) (prohibition of girls from a high school
wrestling team created an equal protection claim); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic
Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (class action challenging exclusion of girls from boys’
contact and non-contact sports teams as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
57. See generally Miss Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); United States v. Vir-
ginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Hoover v. Meikeljohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Force v.
Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp
1496 (D. Kan. 1996).
58. See generally Hogan, 458 U.S. at 718.
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scrutiny, not simply rational basis review, under the Equal Protection
Clause.59 The Court clarified that the proper test for gender discrimi-
nation is whether “the gender-based classification is substantially re-
lated to an important governmental objective.”60 The State has the
burden.61 In an attempt to justify its exclusion of male students from
the nursing program, the school in Hogan asserted that the admissions
policy “compensate[d] for discrimination against women and, there-
fore, constitute[d] affirmative action.”62 The Court found the school’s
affirmative action argument unpersuasive because the admissions pol-
icy perpetuated “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females.”63 In other words, the exclusion of male applicants
from the all-women’s nursing program perpetuated the stereotypical
notion that nursing is a woman’s job. The Court further stated that
“[c]are must be taken in ascertaining whether the objective itself re-
flects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective
is to exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender because they are
presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately infer-
ior, the objective itself is illegitimate.”64 For this reason, the Court in
Hogan held that an all-women’s nursing program’s refusal to admit a
male applicant was unconstitutional.65
The Court in United States v. Virginia elevated the level of scrutiny
for gender discrimination cases by requiring the state to prove an “ex-
ceedingly persuasive” justification for the discriminatory provision
rather than an “important” one.66 In applying this heightened inter-
mediate scrutiny, the Court held that the exclusion of women from the
Virginia Military Institute was unconstitutional because the separate
women’s institute for leadership was insufficient, thereby denying
women the same opportunity available to men.67 The Court reasoned
that the exclusion of women from the military academy originated
from historical stereotypes, and that so-called “gender-based develop-
mental differences” and the view that women tend to “thrive in a co-
operative atmosphere whereas males ‘tend to need an atmosphere of
adversativeness,’” were an impermissible basis upon which to exclude
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 727; Jenny L. Matthews, Admission Denied: An Examination of a Single-Sex Public
School Initiative in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 2032, 2045 (2004).
63. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
67. Id.
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women.68 Furthermore, the Court stated that the defendant may not
rely on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capaci-
ties, or preferences of males and females” to justify the exclusion of
one sex.69 The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized and not
a pro-hoc rationalization.70
2. Sex Discrimination in Sports Under the Equal Protection Clause
In the context of sex discrimination in sports, courts historically up-
held various governmental objectives as “important” under the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard, including protecting women from injury.71
For example, the court in Lafler v. Athletic Board of Control held that
the detrimental effects on women’s safety justified the exclusion of
women from participating against men in boxing competitions.72 How-
ever, after United States v. Virginia established a higher level of scru-
tiny, female student athletes have successfully argued that although
protecting women from injury is an important governmental interest,
it is not exceedingly persuasive when compared to the need to redress
past discrimination against women in athletics.73
In most cases, the excluding school district or athletic association
has attempted to justify the complete exclusion of women from men’s
teams by asserting student safety as the important or exceedingly per-
suasive governmental objective.74 While the courts have agreed that
safety was an important objective in the abstract, they have found that
the exclusion of women was not substantially related to student safety
because (1) it was based on group generalizations and assumptions
rather than individualized assessment of the athletes’ abilities;75 (2)
the application of the student safety objective was inconsistent be-
tween men and women that were both at risk of injury;76 and (3) other
non-discriminatory alternatives were available to protect the athletes
from injury.77
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Demery, supra note 5, at 384.
72. 536 F. Supp. 104, 107 (D.C. Mich. 1982).
73. Demery, supra note 5, at 385.
74. George, supra note 17, at 1126.
75. See Hoover v. Meikeljohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Force v. Pierce City R-VI
Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1029 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
76. See Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp 1496, 1500 (D. Kan. 1996).
77. See Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis.
1978).
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a. Safety Rationale Is Based on Group Generalizations and
Stereotypical Assumptions
The courts have consistently held that the student safety rationale
does not justify the exclusion of women because it is based on general-
izations and assumptions about the inferior ability of female athletes.
In Hoover v. Meikeljohn, the court rejected the Colorado High School
Activities Association’s argument that allowing girls to play would ex-
pose them to an inordinate risk of injury and granted the female plain-
tiff access to the high school boys’ soccer team.78 The court recognized
the innate biological difference between men and women, but empha-
sized that there is a greater difference among male athletes than there
is between male and female athletes.79 Smaller, weaker male athletes
are also at risk of injury from competition with larger, stronger male
athletes, but there is no required physical criteria or protective exclu-
sionary mechanism in place for these weaker male athletes, so there
need not be one for female athletes.80 The court recognized that if the
health and safety of athletes is the asserted governmental interest, it
should be applied to these smaller males as well. The fact that it is not
destroys the safety rationale entirely and emphasizes that this patron-
izing protection of female athletes is an unconstitutional gender classi-
fication.81 Furthermore, the court stated that “[a]ny notion that young
women are so inherently weak, delicate or physically inadequate that
the state must protect them from the folly of participation in vigorous
athletics is a cultural anachronism unrelated to reality.”82
Similarly, the court in Force v. Pierce City R-VI School District
noted that gender classifications perpetuate stereotypic notions of the
proper roles of men and women and concluded that safety arguments
based on stereotypes “suggest the very sort of well-meaning but
overly ‘paternalistic’ attitude about females which the Supreme Court
has viewed with concern.”83 The court reasoned that the safety logic
was flawed because it was founded on the view that a “typical”
78. 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977).
79. Id. at 169 (“the range of differences among individuals in both sexes is greater than the
average differences between sexes”).
80. Id. (“The failure to establish any physical criteria to protect small or weak males from the
injurious effects of competition with larger or stronger males destroys the credibility of the rea-
soning urged in support of sex classification. Accordingly, to the extent that governmental con-
cern for the health and safety of anyone who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself or
herself to possible injury can ever be an acceptable area of intrusion on individual liberty, there
is no rationality in limiting this patronizing protection to females who want to play soccer.”).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1029 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
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woman is more injury-prone than a “typical” man, but not all women
or men are “typical.”84 The court in Lantz v. Ambach further empha-
sized that the safety rationale is based on generalization, rather than
clear data.85 The court stated that a physically fit and qualified female
athlete does not have the opportunity to show that she is as fit, if not
more fit, than the weakest of the male members on the team “simply
because she is a girl.”86
Additionally, courts have found that Equal Protection analysis re-
quires individualized considerations and does not allow group-based
exclusions. For example, in Darrin v. Gould two sisters challenged the
regulations of the Washington Interscholastic Athletic Association
that prohibited girls from playing on the high school football team.87
The Supreme Court of Washington found the exclusion of women
without an individualized determination of their qualifications was un-
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.88 The court stated
“If any individual girl is too weak, injury-prone, or unskilled, she may,
of course be excluded from competition on that basis but she cannot
be excluded solely because of her sex without regard to her relevant
qualifications.”89 Similarly, the court in Packel v. Pennsylvania Inter-
scholastic Athletic Ass’n found the defendant’s complete bar of female
participation in male athletics was unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause.90 The court noted that even if the school offered
teams for both sexes, the provision would still be unconstitutional be-
cause denying a talented and qualified girl the opportunity to compete
at a potentially higher level on a boys’ team could not be justified
under the notion of equality.91
b. Safety Rationale Is Inconsistently Applied to Male and Female
Athletes
The court in Adams v. Baker pointed out the inconsistent applica-
tion of the safety factor between boys and girls.92 In this case, the
school’s wrestling coach testified to the level of strength, conditioning,
and speed needed to participate on the men’s wrestling team.93 He
84. Id. at 1028.
85. 620 F. Supp. 663, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. Id.
87. 540 P.2d 882 (Wash 1975).
88. Id. at 891.
89. Id.
90. 334 A.2d 839, 840 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
91. Id.
92. 919 F. Supp 1496, 1500 (D. Kan. 1996).
93. Id.
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stated that the female plaintiff could only bench 120 pounds, whereas
the average boy could bench between 145 and 200 pounds.94 The
coach used this measurement as a justification for the exclusion of the
female athlete from the men’s wrestling team despite the fact that
boys were not required to demonstrate that they could lift over 200
pounds to try out.95 The coach also testified to the various injuries
associated with wrestling, but later admitted that the risk of injury was
not more serious to female athletes than to males.96
c. Availability of Non-Discriminatory Alternatives
The court in Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n found
that the complete bar of women from male contact sports was not
substantially related to the important governmental interest of pro-
tecting women from injury because less restrictive alternatives were
available.97 The court suggested two alternatives to the complete bar
of coeducational teams: “(1) dropping all varsity interscholastic com-
petition, and (2) establishing separate girls teams for contact sports.”98
Additionally, the court refused to accept the athletic association’s
view that women should be completely excluded from participation in
men’s athletics simply because they are biologically inferior and more
injury-prone.99
3. Limitations of the Equal Protection Clause
Although plaintiffs have been more successful when bringing a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause than Title IX, such success is
limited. The Equal Protection Clause only allows injunctive relief, and
by the time the athlete can bring her suit against the educational insti-
tution or athletic association, her claim may be moot because she has
either graduated or exceeded the age of eligibility to play on the de-
sired team.100 Additionally, Title IX limits the applicability of the
Equal Protection Clause for female student athletes seeking gender
equality. In Smith v. Robinson, the Court held that if the constitu-
tional right the litigant seeks to vindicate through § 1983 is “virtually
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Gomes v. R.I. Interscholastic League, 604 F.2d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 1979) (The
court vacated the case as moot because, by the time the case was decided, the male student
athlete had already graduated from high school and, thus, the injunction allowing him to partici-
pate on the women’s volleyball team was moot.).
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identical” to the statutorily conferred right, then the litigant cannot
bring the § 1983 claim.101 In other words, the Equal Protection claim
will be superseded by the Title IX claim, and plaintiffs will be limited
to recovery under Title IX and the unfavorable precedent associated
with it.
C. Title VII
Title VII makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.”102 Justice John Paul Stevens explained the impor-
tance of Title VII as follows:
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an employer could
fashion his personnel policies on the basis of assumptions about the
differences between men and women, whether or not the assump-
tions were valid. It is now well recognized that employment deci-
sions cannot be predicated on mere “stereotyped” impressions
about the characteristics of males and females. Myths and purely
habitual assumptions about a woman’s inability to perform certain
kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to em-
ploy qualified individuals, or for paying them less.103
Justice Stevens thus explained that use of stereotypes and class-based
generalizations is not an acceptable employment evaluation method.
More importantly, Title VII was enacted to prohibit the use of such
class-based assumptions about a woman’s employment abilities.
Courts typically analyze Title VII claims under one of three theories
of gender discrimination: individual disparate treatment, systemic dis-
parate treatment, or disparate impact.104 Disparate treatment refers to
direct or circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination.105 Dis-
parate impact relates to “an employer’s neutral employment practice
[that] has had a discriminatory effect on a protected class of which the
plaintiff is a member.”106 This Comment will focus on disparate treat-
ment analysis as it applies to female athletes.
In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must first provide a
prima facie case by proving: (1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) plaintiff applied and was qualified for the employment in question;
(3) plaintiff was rejected; and (4) the job remained open after rejec-
101. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
103. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
104. Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2013).
105. Id. at 8.
106. LINDA SHARP ET AL., SPORTS LAW: A MANAGERIAL APPROACH 107 (2007).
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tion and the employer continued the job search among similarly quali-
fied applicants.107 Once a prima facie case is established, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son.108 Once the employer provides a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
employer’s reasons were pretext based on the preponderance of the
evidence.109
For systemic disparate treatment, a plaintiff must establish a dis-
criminatory practice or pattern using statistics demonstrating substan-
tial underrepresentation of a protected group relative to numbers
expected under random hiring.110 The employer can challenge the fac-
tual basis on which the plaintiff’s case rests or rebut the inference of
discrimination from the statistical showing by offering a nondiscrimi-
natory explanation.111 An employer may respond to a prima facie case
of discrimination by “citing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason,
business necessity, or a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ).”112 If an employer can meet this burden, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to establish that the employer’s defense is
pretext.113
Under the BFOQ exception in Title VII providing that an employer
may discriminate on the basis of “religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of that particular business or enterprise,” the term “occupa-
tional” refers to qualifications that affect an employee’s ability to do
the job.114 The safety exception within the BFOQ defense to sex dis-
crimination claims is only applied when the employee’s sex actually
interferes with her ability to work.115
This Section will provide the case history of Title VII and the
BFOQ exception. Section C.1 looks at Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins116
to show that an employer cannot rely on sex stereotypes and an indi-
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2018); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
108. Id. (burden of production not persuasion).
109. Id.
110. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
111. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 313 (7th Cir. 1988).
112. Dennis, supra note 39, at 359 (examples of BFOQs: need and privacy interests of the
employer’s clientele; business necessity; safety concerns for female employees; reliance on stat-
utes or government policy).
113. SHARP ET AL., supra note 106, at 108.
114. 42 U.S.C § 2000(e)-2(e)(1). See also Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 188 (1991).
115. § 2000(e)-2(e)(1); Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 188.
116. See generally 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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vidual’s failure to conform to such sex stereotypes when making an
adverse employment decision. Section C.2 looks at City of Los Ange-
les Department of Water and Power v. Manhart117 to show that Title
VII precludes an employer from creating personnel policies and prac-
tices on the basis of generalizations and assumptions about the differ-
ences between men and women, regardless of whether such sex
generalizations are true. Section C.3 examines International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.118 to show that the safety exception to
the BFOQ is limited to instances in which sex actually interferes with
an employee’s ability to perform the job. Section C.4 discusses
Dothard v. Rawlinson119 to show that Title VII protects a woman’s
decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment unless such risks
are to third parties whose safety is indispensable to the particular busi-
ness. Section C.5 looks to Diaz v. Pan American World Airways120 to
show that the preference of co-workers, clients, customers and other
third parties does not justify the exclusion of an entire sex of employ-
ees unless the employer can provide a factual basis that all or substan-
tially all members of that class cannot adequately perform the
essential functions of the job.
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Individual Disparate Treatment
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a female attorney filed a Title VII
sex discrimination claim against her firm for denying her a partnership
position due to sex-based evaluations.121 The Supreme Court held that
sex stereotyping played a part in evaluating the plaintiff’s candidacy
and the defendant firm failed to prove by a preponderance of evi-
dence that the same decision would have been justified absent the dis-
criminatory intent.122
Ann Hopkins had worked for Price Waterhouse for five years and
maintained and secured successful major contracts for the partnership,
including a $25 million contract with the Department of State the year
prior to her candidacy.123 While Hopkins was praised by partners and
clients for her competence and assertiveness, staff members often
complained about her “abrasiveness.”124 As a result, her partner eval-
117. See generally 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
118. See generally 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
119. See generally 433 U.S. 323 (1977).
120. See generally 442 F.2d 385 (1971).
121. 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989).
122. Id. at 258.
123. Id. at 233.
124. Id. at 234.
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uations contained negative remarks about her interpersonal skills.125
Several evaluations stated that Hopkins was “overly aggressive, un-
duly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff.”126
While some evaluations expressed legitimate concerns, several
others reacted negatively to Hopkins’ personality simply because she
was a woman.127 For example, “[o]ne partner described her as
‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a
woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school’. Several
partners criticized her use of profanity . . . ‘because it’s a lady using
foul language.’”128 One partner advised Hopkins to walk, talk, and
dress more femininely, to wear make-up, to have her hair styled, and
to wear jewelry.129 These sharply critical remarks about Hopkins’ in-
terpersonal skills and appearance constituted sex stereotyping.130 In
the specific context of sex stereotyping, “an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”131 In finding that Hopkins’
sex was a motivating factor in the employment decision, the Court
stated:
we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees
by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
with their group . . . . An employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave
aggressively and out of a job if they do not.132
The Court emphasized that an individual’s failure to conform with
sex-based stereotypes does not justify an adverse employment deci-
sion. Gender nonconformity is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son and reliance on sex-based stereotypes constitutes discrimination.
The lower court judge found evidence that the firm generally disfa-
vored female partners and often evaluated female candidates on sex-
based terms.133 The judge found that “candidates were viewed favora-
bly if partners believed they maintained their femin[in]ity while be-
coming effective personal managers,” and “[o]ne partner repeatedly
commented that he could not consider any woman seriously as a part-
nership candidate and believed that women were not even capable of
125. Id. at 235.
126. Id.
127. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 236 (according to social psychologist Dr. Susan Fiske).
131. Id. at 250.
132. Id. at 251.
133. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236.
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functioning as senior managers.”134 The judge concluded that some of
the partners’ remarks about Hopkins “stemmed from an impermissi-
bly cabined view of the proper behavior of women” and Hopkins’ fail-
ure to conform to their ideal gender stereotypes.135
In determining whether the firm denied Hopkins a partnership deci-
sion because of her sex, the Court interpreted the causal language of
the statute as a condemnation of mixed-motive decisions—those
based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.136 In
other words, an employer’s decision is “because of sex” even if the
employer considered legitimate factors in addition to the sex-based
factors.137 While the plaintiff must show that the employer relied on
sex-based factors, the employer can avoid liability in a mixed-motive
case by showing that it would have come to the same decision even if
gender was not taken into account.138
The Price Waterhouse case established a “same decision” proof
structure to balance the employer’s freedom to make business deci-
sions with Title VII’s prohibition of employment decisions based on
sex. In summation, an employer cannot make employment decisions
based on gender, but an employer may decide against a woman for
other legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.139
2. City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v.
Manhart: Systemic Disparate Treatment
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,
the Supreme Court held that the city department’s policy of making
female employees contribute more money to the pension fund vio-
lated both the language and policy of Title VII.140 More specifically,
the Court found that the employment practice discriminated against
individual female employees because of their sex in violation of
§ 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.141
The department’s retirement benefits were entirely funded by em-
ployee contributions.142 Each employee was eligible for a monthly re-
tirement benefit computed as a fraction of his or her salary multiplied
134. Id.
135. Id. at 237.
136. Id. at 241.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 242.
139. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243.
140. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
141. Id. at 702–03.
142. Id.
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by the employee’s years of service.143 While the monthly benefits for
men and women of the same age, seniority, and salary were equal
upon retirement, female employees were required to contribute more
of their paycheck to the pension fund during their employment.144 As
a result, female employees took home less pay than their male coun-
terparts because the employee pension contribution was withheld
from employee paychecks.145
The city department attempted to justify the different contribution
requirements by claiming that the cost of an average female em-
ployee’s pension was greater than that of the average male retiree be-
cause its female employees, on average, will live a few years longer
than its male employees.146 Since female employees would generally
require more retirement benefits, the city felt they should be required
to contribute more to the pension fund. It followed, according to the
city department, that it would be unfair to male employees to require
them to pay an equivalent amount into the pension fund when they
would not be receiving an equivalent benefit.147 In other words, fair-
ness to male employees required the differential in take-home pay be-
tween the sexes because it offset the difference in the value of the
pension benefits provided to each sex.148 For this reason, the city de-
partment claimed that “the differential was based on a factor ‘other
than sex’” and was, therefore, not discrimination within the meaning
of § 703(a)(1).149
The Court critiqued the city department’s use of gender-based char-
acteristics about men and women as general classes as inconsistent
with Title VII’s focus on the individual.150 Title VII precludes treat-
ment of individuals as simple components of a sexual class.151 It re-
quires fairness to individuals rather than fairness to the class.152 In
other words, the statute prevents employers from fashioning person-
nel policies and practices based on generalizations and assumptions
about the differences between each sex as a whole, even if such class-
based assumption are valid.153 Although the generalization that
women, as a class, live longer than men was accepted as “unquestiona-
143. Id. at 705.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705 (based on a study of mortality tables and personal experience).
147. Id. at 709.
148. Id. at 706.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 707.
151. Id. at 708–09.
152. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708–09.
153. Id. at 707.
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bly true” by both parties, the use of such a generalization was imper-
missible because “all individuals in the respective classes do not share
the characteristic that differentiates the average class representa-
tives.”154 The city department provided no substantial proof that its
individual female employees lived longer than its individual male em-
ployees.155 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the city department’s
pension policy constituted discrimination under Title VII because it
classified employees in terms of their sex instead of their individual
characteristics.156
Manhart established that “[e]ven a true generalization about the
class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom
the generalization does not apply.”157 The case shifted the focus of
Title VII analysis to characteristics of the individual rather than gener-
alizations of the class.
3. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification
In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Court
held that the company’s policy of excluding all fertile female employ-
ees from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure was facially
discriminatory under Title VII.158 A facially discriminatory policy
under Title VII can only be defended by the establishment of a
BFOQ.159 Here, the Court found that the employer’s policy of exclu-
sion did not satisfy the safety exception to a BFOQ because a female
employee’s fertility did not interfere with her ability to perform her
job.160
In this case, the employer’s policy required female employees to
provide medical documentation of their infertility before working in
battery manufacturing jobs.161 Male employees were not required to
provide the same medical proof of infertility despite evidence of the
debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive sys-
tem.162 Therefore, fertile men, but not fertile women, were allowed to
decide for themselves whether or not they wanted to assume the risk
154. Id. at 708.
155. Id. at 708–709.
156. Id. at 710–11.
157. Id. at 708.
158. 499 U.S. 187, 199–200 (1991).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 204.
161. Id. at 192.
162. Id. at 198.
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of injuring their reproductive health for a job.163 In this way, the com-
pany policy contained a facial classification based on gender because it
excluded only women of childbearing age, not men, from jobs with
inherent lead exposure.164
For this reason, the Court held that the company’s policy facially
discriminated against its female employees on the basis of their poten-
tial for pregnancy, thereby violating both Title VII and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978.165 In addition, the Court explained that
the “absence of a malevolent motive [did] not convert a facially dis-
criminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory ef-
fect.”166 The employer, therefore, was required to defend the explicit
gender-based policy as a BFOQ.167
The Court interpreted the BFOQ defense narrowly. It explained
that the BFOQ defense “limits the situations in which discrimination
is permissible to ‘certain instances’ where sex discrimination is ‘rea-
sonably necessary’ to the ‘normal operation’ of the ‘particular’ busi-
ness.”168 The Court indicated that the use of the term “occupational”
in the statute referred to “objective, verifiable requirements [that]
must concern job-related skills and aptitudes.”169 To satisfy the
Court’s narrow interpretation of BFOQ, the job qualification must go
to the business’ “essence” or “central mission.”170
The company argued that the policy of exclusion satisfied the safety
exception to BFOQ because the company enacted the policy to ensure
the safety of all female employees’ unborn fetuses.171 In response, the
Court held that the “safety exception is limited to instances in which
sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee’s ability to per-
form the job.”172 Here, the employer failed to show any “factual basis
for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved,” and,
163. Id. at 197.
164. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197.
165. Id. at 199 (“In its use of the words, ‘capable of bearing children’ in the 1982 policy state-
ment as the criterion for exclusion, Johnson Controls explicitly classifies on the basis of potential
for pregnancy. Under the PDA, such a classification must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in
the same light as explicit sex discrimination.”).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 200.
168. Id. at 201.
169. Id.
170. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 323, 333
(1977)).
171. Id. at 202.
172. Id. at 203.
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therefore, the employer did not establish a BFOQ.173 Since the em-
ployer could not establish a BFOQ, the policy was facially discrimina-
tory on the basis of sex, and thus violated Title VII.
Johnson Controls established a narrow interpretation of the safety
exception to the BFOQ. To sufficiently establish a BFOQ defense af-
ter this case, an employer must show that (1) the particular job re-
quires exclusion of “all or substantially all” members of a particular
group, and (2) the BFOQ relates to the essence or central mission of
the employer’s business.174 This interpretation prevents the use of
general, subjective standards as a justification for any policy of exclu-
sion based on sex.
4. Dothard v. Rawlinson: Disparate Impact
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, a female who sought employment from
the Alabama Board of Corrections as a prison guard brought suit
under Title VII alleging that she had been denied employment be-
cause of her sex.175 The plaintiff was refused employment because she
failed to meet the weight requirement established by an Alabama stat-
ute.176 The plaintiff challenged the height and weight requirement,
and the administrative regulation that established a gender criteria for
assigning correctional counselors to maximum-security institutions for
“contact positions.”177
The height and weight requirements did not contain explicit facially
discriminatory language like the policy in Johnson Controls, but the
plaintiff asserted that “these facially neutral qualification standards
work in fact disproportionately to exclude women from eligibility for
employment by the Alabama Board of Corrections.”178 The Court
looked to the disparate impact test established by Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.179 to determine if the plaintiff showed that the facially neu-
tral height and weight requirements selected applicants for hire “in a
significantly discriminatory pattern.”180 Here, the height requirement
(a minimum of five feet, two inches tall) would “exclude 33.29% of
women in the United States between the ages of 18-79, while exclud-
173. Id. at 207 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333).
174. Id.
175. 433 U.S. 323 (1977).
176. Id. at 323–24.
177. Id. at 324–26 (contact positions referred to those that required continual close physical
proximity to inmates).
178. Id. at 329.
179. See generally 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
180. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
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ing only 1.28% of men between the same ages.”181 The weight re-
quirement (a minimum of 120 pounds) would exclude 22.29% of the
women and 2.35% of the men in this same age group.182 The Court
found this statistical evidence satisfactory to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination.183
To rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case, an employer must show that
the requirement at issue has a “manifest relationship” to the job.184
Here, the employer argued that the height and weight requirements
related to strength and argued that strength is an essential element to
the job as a correctional counselor but failed to offer any specific evi-
dence to justify this assertion.185 The Court suggested that a test di-
rectly measuring strength, rather than using the height and weight
requirements as a proxy for strength, would be more appropriate if
strength is actually a bona fide, job-related quality.186 Furthermore,
the Court stated that a fairly administered test for strength would fully
satisfy Title VII because it would “‘measure the person for the job
and not the person in the abstract.’”187 Since other selection devices
could have been used without a similar discriminatory effect, the
Court concluded that the height and weight requirements were pro-
hibited under Title VII.188
The Court did, however, uphold the employer’s regulation explicitly
prohibiting women from working in contact positions in male correc-
tional facilities as a BFOQ.189 The Court initially stated that Title VII
generally prohibits an employer from making an employment decision
because of sex-based stereotypes about the class as a whole.190 Fur-
thermore, the argument that a particular job is too inherently danger-
ous for women as a class is often rejected as a BFOQ because the
purpose of Title VII is to allow the individual employee the opportu-
nity to decide whether or not to accept the risk of injury inherently
associated with a particular employment position.191 Here, however,
more was at stake than a woman’s decision to accept the risks of em-
181. Id.
182. Id. at 329–30 (stating that the reliance on general population demographic data instead
of the potential applicant pool was not misplaced).
183. Id. at 330.
184. Id. at 329 (citing Griggs, 402 U.S. at 424).
185. Id. at 332 (“a sufficient but unspecified amount of [strength] is essential to effective job
performance as a correctional counselor”).
186. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332.
187. Id. at 332 (quoting Griggs, 402 U.S. at 436).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 331.
190. Id. at 333.
191. Id. at 335.
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ployment.192 The violent, disorganized environment of the prison and
the prevalence of criminally-convicted sex offenders presented “a real
threat not only to the victim of the assault [the female guard,] but also
to the basic control of the penitentiary and protection of its inmates
and the other security personnel.”193 Additionally, the Court reasoned
that sex was related to the guard’s ability to maintain prison security,
the essence of employment as a correctional counselor.194 For these
reasons, the Court accepted the employer’s BFOQ for the job of cor-
rectional counselor in a contact position in a male maximum-security
penitentiary.195
Dothard allowed an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex
only because the safety of third parties that were indispensable to the
particular business were at risk, and the employer established a high
correlation between sex and the ability to perform job functions. The
Court did not, however, allow the employer to use sex as a proxy for
strength. Throughout its decision, the court stressed Title VII’s protec-
tion of a woman’s right to weigh and accept the risks of employ-
ment—even dangerous employment that may place her in harm’s way.
5. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways: Third-Party Preference
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, the Fifth Circuit held that
being female did not constitute a BFOQ for a flight attendant position
and the employer’s refusal to hire male flight attendants solely be-
cause of their sex constituted a violation of Title VII.196 The court
stated that “discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence
of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring mem-
bers of one sex exclusively.”197
The plaintiff applied for a flight attendant job with Pan American
Airlines but was rejected because Pan Am had a policy of restricting
the flight attendant position to females only.198 The plaintiff filed suit
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleg-
ing that Pan American Airlines violated Title VII by refusing to em-
ploy him on the basis of sex.199 Pan American Airlines argued that
restricting the flight attendant position to female employees was “rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of Pan American’s busi-
192. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
193. Id. at 336.
194. Id. at 335.
195. Id. at 337.
196. 442 F.2d 385, 386 (1971).
197. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 386.
199. Id.
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ness.”200 The employer alleged that female flight attendants “were
superior in such non-mechanical aspects of the job” like “providing
reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized ser-
vices” and “making flights as pleasurable as possible . . . .”201 The trial
court found that Pan Am’s passengers preferred female flight attend-
ants.202 With this in mind, the trial court determined that the female-
only policy effectively screened out unsatisfactory applicants and that
an elimination of this policy would result in a reduction of
performance.203
In reversing the trial court’s BFOQ finding, the Fifth Circuit
adopted the EEOC guidelines which stated that “the bona fide occu-
pational qualification as to sex should be interpreted narrowly” and
the language of the exception compels close scrutiny.204 Furthermore,
the court stated that Congress did not intend for the BFOQ to allow
an employer to “legitimately discriminate against a group solely be-
cause his employees, customers, or clients discriminated against that
group.”205 The preference of third parties did not justify the discrimi-
nation practiced by Pan Am because the BFOQ exception requires a
“business necessity test, not a business convenience test.”206 In other
words, discrimination based on sex is valid “only when the essence of
the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members
of one sex exclusively.”207
Here, the court found that the inclusion of male flight attendants
would not jeopardize the airline’s primary function of transporting
passengers safely.208 The essence of the airline is to provide safe
travel, not to ensure a pleasant environment enhanced by the “obvi-
ous cosmetic effect” of female stewardesses that provide non-mechan-
ical functions of the job.209 The court did not dismiss the employer’s
ability to consider an individual’s performance of the non-mechanical
functions of the job; however, the court emphasized that an employer
is not justified in excluding all males simply because most males may
not perform the non-mechanical aspects of the job as adequately as
females.210 Since the employer failed to provide a factual basis that all
200. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. 1604.1 (2012)).
201. Id. at 387 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
202. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387.
203. Id. at 387–88.
204. Id. at 387.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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or substantially all men would not be able to perform the job safely
and efficiently, the court concluded that the BFOQ exception did not
apply.
Diaz established a test for determining whether or not an em-
ployer’s discriminatory employment practice falls within the BFOQ
exception. The Fifth Circuit stated that “[b]efore sex discrimination
can be practiced, it must not only be shown that it is impracticable to
find the men that possess the abilities that most women possess, but
that the abilities are necessary to the business, not merely tangen-
tial.”211 Additionally, the preferences of co-workers, the employer, cli-
ents, or customers do not provide a justification for the exclusion of a
protected class because it is these very prejudices and preferences that
Title VII was meant to overcome.212
II. ANALYSIS
Title IX was enacted over forty years ago with the goal of remedy-
ing the history of sex discrimination in education and educational ac-
tivities.213 The presence of the contact sport exception, however, is in
direct conflict with this purpose. It acts as a complete bar to female
participation in a wide array of sports.214 As a result, this history of
exclusion that Title IX sought to remedy is still in effect and, more
importantly, is statutorily mandated. To prevent further exclusion of
female athletes from contact sports and to adequately effectuate Title
IX’s ban on sex discrimination in education and educational activities,
the legislature must eliminate the contact sport exception.
Additionally, the contact sport exception is unconstitutional and in-
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Although student ath-
letes have been able to recover under the Equal Protection Clause for
claims of sexual discrimination in athletics, this recovery is limited.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, student athletes can only seek
injunctive relief and most suits will become moot before they can be
decided.215 Additionally, case law suggests that courts may require
student athletes to rely on Title IX as the superseding statute, thereby
barring recovery under the Equal Protection Clause.216 Since the
Equal Protection route is limited and Title IX claims are often de-
feated by the contact sport exception, the only way to allow female
211. Id. at 388–89 (emphasis added).
212. Id.
213. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
214. George, supra note 17, at 1107.
215. See supra Section I.B.3.
216. Id.
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athletes to participate in male contact sports is to change the law.
Congress needs to rescind the contact sport exception and reopen the
gates to the football fields and the doors to the basketball courts. Re-
scission will give female student athletes the opportunity to try out for
male contact sports. It will force athletic programs to base their deter-
minations on each student athlete’s individualized abilities and con-
demn the use of stereotypical generalizations about female student
athletes as a class.
Section A will argue that the contact sport exception is unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause because the complete exclu-
sion of female athletes from contact sports is not substantially related
to the important, or exceedingly persuasive, government interest of
protecting student athletes.
Section B will then analyze the contact sport exception under Title
VII and argue that the complete exclusion of female athletes from
male contact sports would constitute a formal policy of discrimination
based on sex under systemic disparate treatment. More specifically,
this cross-statutory analysis will adopt the employment law framework
to emphasize the unconstitutionality of the contact sport exception as
an unjustifiable exclusion of a protected class from a type of activity.
This cross-statutory analysis is not meant to provide an alternative liti-
gation strategy for female athletes seeking relief from gender discrimi-
nation in athletics.217 It is directed at the legislature, not the courts, to
support the elimination of the contact sport exception and to highlight
the inconsistencies between two statutes that share an intimately re-
lated objective—the elimination of sex discrimination.
A. The Contact Sport Exception Is Unconstitutional
A purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to remove “legislative
classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of
gender [because they] carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereo-
types and the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special pro-
tection.”218 The contact sport exception creates such a classification
and explicitly excludes female athletes from male contact sports. The
contact sport exception is, therefore, inconsistent with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because it intentionally discriminates against female
athletes on the basis of sex and permits schools to engage in this bla-
217. Currently, student athletes do not have standing to challenge the contact sport exception
under Title VII because they are not considered employees. See infra Section III.A.
218. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (holding an Alabama statute requiring only hus-
bands, not wives, to pay alimony upon divorce unconstitutional).
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tantly offensive sex-based discrimination.219 When the constitutional-
ity of the contact sport exception has been challenged, schools and
athletic associations have contended that Congress included the con-
tact sport exception out of a genuine concern to protect female ath-
letes from unacceptable injury rates.220 Although the protection of
female athletes is an important governmental interest, various courts
have held that the contact sport exception is not substantially related
and is, therefore, unconstitutional.221 More specifically, the contact
sport exception is not substantially related to the important govern-
ment interest of protecting student athletes from harm because the
safety rationale is based on group generalizations and stereotypes and
the exclusion of all women is inconsistent with the inclusion of
weaker, smaller male athletes that are similarly prone to injury.222
1. Application of the Equal Protection Clause
The contact sport exception and the associated safety rationale al-
lows schools and athletic associations to evaluate athletes based on
the abilities associated with their sex. It relies on generalized stereo-
types about females as inherently weak and in need of governmental
protection.223 Such a class-based evaluation is both underinclusive and
overinclusive. It is underinclusive because it fails to protect smaller,
weaker males from the injuries inherent in participating in contact
sports with bigger, stronger males. It is overinclusive because it ex-
cludes strong and skilled female athletes that may be more physically
qualified to compete than the weakest male. Rather than relying on a
class-based evaluation, schools and athletic associations should evalu-
ate athletes based on their individual qualifications. This would pro-
tect the unskilled, weak athletes from any injuries associated with
participating in contact sports with stronger athletes—regardless of
whether those athletes are male or female.
Courts have held that individual considerations, or tryouts, are a
more accurate way of not only protecting the safety of female athletes,
but also protecting the safety of weaker male athletes.224 These courts
have emphasized that the biological evidence does not justify a class-
based evaluation. While evidence shows that “males as a class tend to
219. Demery, supra note 5, at 376.
220. George, supra note 17, at 1129.
221. See, e.g., Hoover v. Meikeljohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977); Packel v. Penn-
sylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 334 A.2d 839, 839 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
222. See supra Section I.B.2.
223. See Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 164; Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020,
1029 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash 1975).
224. See Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 164; Force, 570 F. Supp. at 1029; Darrin, 540 P.2d at 882.
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have an advantage in strength and speed over females as a class and
that a collision between a male and a female would tend to be to the
disadvantage of the female,” class based discrimination is impermissi-
ble when “the evidence also shows that the range of differences
among individuals of both sexes is greater than the average differ-
ences between the sexes.”225 In other words, the existence of certain
characteristics, like speed and strength, in one sex does not justify
classification based on sex. If an individual, male or female, is too
weak, slow or unskilled, then that individual may be excluded from
competition on that basis but should not be excluded solely because of
her sex.226 In order for the contact sport exception to be substantially
related to athletic safety, there would have to be evidence that every
single female athlete is weaker than every single male athlete, and
that just simply is not the case.
Additionally, athletic programs that exclude women from partici-
pating in a contact sport solely based on sex violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because they rely on stereotypes of male and female
talents, capacities, or preferences.227 The proposed governmental in-
terest of safety ignores the possibility that some female athletes may
be more physically qualified to compete on men’s teams than the
weakest male members. This safety rationale is flawed because it is
rooted in generalized stereotypes about the average physical differ-
ences between men and women as distinct classes and does not con-
sider the athletes individually.228 The notion that women are
inherently weak and in need of governmental protection from the in-
jurious effects associated with competition with male athletes is
archaic and patriarchal and, more importantly, inconsistent with the
refusal to do the same for weak male athletes. Such gender classifica-
tions “carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the
‘proper place’ of women and their need for special protection.”229 An
athlete should be evaluated based on his or her individual characteris-
tics and abilities, not on the basis of sex. If the female athlete is shown
to be weaker at practice than the smallest male, then she may be cut
based on her inability to compete at the level necessary to adequately
contribute to the team. Similarly, if a male player is shown to be
225. Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 169.
226. Packel, 334 A.2d at 843.
227. Kelsey R. Chapple, Sports for Boys, Wedding Cakes for Girls: the Inevitability of Stere-
otyping in Schools Segregated by Sex, 94 TEX. L. REV. 537, 542 (2016).
228. Blake J. Furman, Gender Equity in High School Sports: Why There is a Contact Sports
Exception to Title IX, Eliminating It, and a Proposal for the Future, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1169, 1178 (2007).
229. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
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weaker at tryouts than a female athlete, then he may be cut based on
his inability to compete at the necessary level. The sex of the player
should not be determinative of his or her ability to participate in the
sport.
Thus, the contact sport exception is not substantially related to the
important governmental interest of protecting athletes from injury be-
cause: it is based on generalizations about the abilities of females as a
class; it is inconsistently applied to males and females that are simi-
larly situated and equally exposed to injury; and it does not consider
less discriminatory alternatives such as individualized considerations
or tryouts. Therefore, the contact sport exception must be rescinded
because it is unconstitutional and perpetuates the stereotype that fe-
males are second-class athletes in need of governmental protection.
2. Limitations of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the majority of gender discrimination in athletics claims
are successful under the Equal Protection Clause, the outcome of suc-
cess is limited.230 Litigation is expensive, and remedy is limited to in-
junctive relief. The injunction that provides female athletes with the
opportunity to play may be too late and the cases may be deemed
moot because “the student-athlete may have already graduated or
chosen not to participate.”231 The cost and possibility of the case be-
coming moot before recovery dissuades many women from litigating
and seeking the opportunity to participate in contact sports.
The inability to succeed on an enforceable remedy under the Equal
Protection Clause and the unfavorable precedent in Title IX cases dis-
courages female student athletes from challenging the contact sport
exception and shields the legislature from recognizing the need for
reform. The next Section provides a new argument for challenging the
contact sport exception—an argument under Title VII’s employment
discrimination—with the hope of awakening the legislature to instill
change in the world of female athletics.
B. Cross-Statutory Analysis: Title IX’s Contact Sport Exception Is
Impermissible Under Title VII’s Disparate
Treatment Analysis
Since the unconstitutionality of the contact sport exception has not
already caused the legislature to rescind the contact sport exception,
230. See supra Section I.B.3.
231. Demery, supra note 5, at 386–87; Gomes v. R.I. Interscholastic League, 604 F.2d 733, 736
(1st Cir. 1979).
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this Comment hopes to spark the conversation by pointing out the
inconsistencies between the contact sport exception in Title IX and
the judicial system’s application of Title VII regarding sex discrimina-
tion in employment. The same analysis that courts have adopted in
employment discrimination cases can be used to support the rescission
of the contact sport exception in Title IX. To illustrate, this Section
will provide a theoretical analysis of the contact sport exception under
Title VII’s systemic disparate treatment analysis.232 First, it will pro-
vide a prima facie case that the contact sport exception would consti-
tute a formal policy of discrimination against female athletes. Second,
it will provide the school’s defense of the contact sport exception as a
BFOQ. Third, it will show that the BFOQ safety rationale would be
pretextual and, therefore, discriminatory against female athletes.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, re-
ligion, sex or national origin.”233 Although Title VII only restricts em-
ployers from discriminating against employees, this Section borrows
the statutory framework of Title VII to analyze the contact sport ex-
ception under Title IX. In this analogy, the educational institutions
represent the employer, the female athletes represent the employee,
and the contact sport exception represents the employment policy at
issue. In other words, the female athletes would be challenging the
educational institution’s compliance with or enforcement of the con-
tact sport exception as a formal policy of discrimination based on sex.
The student athlete would bring this claim under the systemic dispa-
rate treatment analysis of Title VII because the contact sport excep-
tion would be a facially discriminatory policy that affects the class of
female athletes as a whole.234 The proof structure applied to formal
policies under systemic disparate treatment is as follows:
(1) the plaintiff must establish the existence of a formal policy that
discriminates against a protected group;
(2) once the plaintiff establishes a formal policy, the burden shifts
to the defendant to establish an affirmative defense of
(a) bona fide occupational qualification, or
232. This is a purely theoretical inquiry and is not meant to be interpreted as a new cause of
action for female student athletes. Student athletes do not currently have standing to challenge
the contact sport exception under Title VII because neither the federal courts nor the legislature
have considered them employees under Title VII. See infra Section III.A.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
234. See supra notes 104–115 and accompanying text (explaining the three different theories
of discrimination under Title VII: individual disparate treatment, systemic disparate treatment,
and disparate impact).
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(b) voluntary affirmative action; and
(3) if the defendant satisfies their burden of establishing a BFOQ
or a voluntary affirmative action, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the defendant’s arguments are pretextual.235
The following Section will adopt this framework to argue that the
contact sport exception would constitute a formal policy of discrimina-
tion against women because it relies on generalized sex stereotypes of
the class as a whole and it does not consider the qualifications of the
individual athlete.236 This Section will also argue that the safety de-
fense for the contact sport exception would clearly not be a voluntary
affirmative action and would not constitute a BFOQ because the sex
of the athlete does not interfere with her ability to play the contact
sport. Finally, this Section will argue that the BFOQ is pretext.
It is important to note, however, that this Section is not suggesting
that a female athlete could or should seek relief for sex discrimination
in school athletics under Title VII because as current case precedent
shows, student athletes are not yet considered employees under Title
VII.237 Rather, this Section is aimed at the legislature to demonstrate
the inconsistencies between Title VII and Title IX, two statutes that
share a closely related purpose of eliminating sex discrimination.238
1. Formal Policy of Discrimination
The contact sport exception intentionally discriminates on the basis
of sex by excluding women from participating in male contact
sports.239 The Code of Federal Regulations explicitly states that
“members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team
offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.”240 By mentioning
the protected class—sex—in the text of the regulation, the contact
sport exception constitutes a facially discriminatory policy. Under Ti-
tle VII, such an intentional exclusion of a protected class constitutes a
formal policy of discrimination when the exclusion (a) relies on gener-
235. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
236. See infra notes 239–251 and accompanying text.
237. See infra Section III.A.
238. For a discussion on the differences between the applicability of Title IX and Title VII
regarding collegiate athletics, see Elizabeth Reinbrecht, Northwestern University and Title IX:
One Step Forward for Football Players, Two Steps Back for Female Student Athletes, 47 U. TOL.
L. REV. 243 (2015).
239. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2000). While the statute also does not allow a male athlete to
participate in a female contact sport, the focus of this Comment is on the exclusion of female
athletes.
240. § 106.41(b) (emphasis added).
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alized stereotypes of the class as a whole and (b) does not consider the
qualifications of the individual.
The exclusion of female athletes from male-dominated contact
sports like men’s football and basketball assumes that female athletes
are weaker, slower, and essentially second-class athletes. Although
these generalizations may be true of the class of women as a whole,
the use of such a generalization is impermissible because “all individu-
als in the respective classes do not share the characteristic that differ-
entiates the average class representatives.”241 Price Waterhouse and
Manhart established that Title VII precludes an employer from relying
on generalizations, assumptions, and stereotypes about the differences
between men and women, regardless of whether such generalizations
are true, when making an adverse employment decision.242 Similarly,
an educational institution should be precluded from relying on the
stereotypical assumption that female athletes are typically more in-
jury-prone than male athletes when denying an individual the oppor-
tunity to participate in a contact sport.243
In Price Waterhouse, Justice Stevens articulated the need for change
in employers’ reliance on generalized sex stereotypes as an evaluation
mechanism because individual employees may not match the stereo-
types associated with their group.244 Similarly, an educational institu-
tion or athletic program should not be allowed to evaluate an athlete
by assuming that she matches the stereotype associated with her sex,
i.e., that she is too weak or fragile to play a contact sport with males.
In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins’ aggressiveness and success coun-
tered the stereotypical assumption that female attorneys are docile,
quiet, or overly feminine, yet she was punished for not conforming to
such stereotypes and instructed to act and dress more femininely to
achieve a partnership position.245 Similarly, female athletes like
Heather Mercer did not align with the sex-based assumption that fe-
males are too weak to sufficiently contribute to male contact sports,
yet she was punished for not conforming to such stereotypes and in-
structed to try beauty pageants instead of playing football.246 Strong
female athletes should not be sidelined because they do not conform
to society’s stereotypical assumptions about their athletic abilities;
241. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
242. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
243. Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1024–25, 1029 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
244. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
245. Id. at 234–35.
246. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 645 (4th Cir. 1999).
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they should be allowed to demonstrate their abilities and try out for
the team.
The Court in Manhart stated that Title VII “precludes treatment of
individuals as simply components of racial, religious, sexual, or na-
tional class” and “requires that we focus on fairness to individuals.”247
In Manhart, the employer’s pension policy was overturned because it
classified employees in terms of their sex instead of their individual
characteristics.248 Similarly, the contact sport exception under Title IX
should be eliminated because it classifies female athletes in terms of
their sex instead of their individual athletic ability. The contact sport
exception excludes qualified female athletes from even trying out for
a male contact sport because of the generalized stereotypes about
men and women.249 As the Court in Manhart held, generalizations
about a class do not justify the disqualification of an individual of that
class to whom those generalization do not apply, even if such general-
izations are true.250 The focus must be on the individual rather than
the generalization of the class.251
Therefore, the contact sport exception would constitute a formal
policy of discrimination under Title VII because it facially discrimi-
nates against female athletes on the basis of their sex, and it relies on
class-based generalizations as an evaluation mechanism.
2. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Once the athlete satisfies the burden of proving a formal policy of
discrimination, the burden would shift to the educational institution to
establish an affirmative defense.252 Title VII provides two different
types of affirmative defenses under systemic disparate treatment: vol-
untary affirmative action and bona fide occupational qualification.253
Since the contact sport exception excludes a historically under-
represented group—women—an affirmative action defense would not
suffice.254 Therefore, the only option the educational institution would
have for justifying the explicit sex discrimination present in the con-
tact sport exception would be to show a BFOQ.
Under Title VII, the defining elements of a BFOQ are (1) the par-
ticular job requires the exclusion of all or substantially all members of
247. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708–09 (1978).
248. Id. at 708, 711.
249. Id. at 707.
250. Id. at 708.
251. Id.
252. Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 221–22 (1991).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2018).
254. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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a protected group and (2) the BFOQ relates to the essence or central
mission of the employer’s business.255 In other words, any discrimina-
tion requirement must be job-related. Courts have interpreted BFOQ
narrowly as an objective, verifiable requirement concerned with job-
related skills and aptitudes.256 When applied to sex discrimination in
athletics, an educational institution or athletic program would attempt
to satisfy the BFOQ elements by showing that the contact sport re-
quires the exclusion of all or substantially all female athletes, and that
sex relates to the essence of the contact sport.
a. Safety Exception
There is a specific safety BFOQ wherein an employer may argue
that the safety of the individual requires his or her exclusion.257 Here,
the educational institution would attempt to justify the exclusion of
female athletes from male contact sports to ensure the safety of fe-
male athletes. This is similar to the argument that educational institu-
tions have used to justify the contact sport exception under the Equal
Protection Clause.258 Courts, however, have interpreted the safety ex-
ception of the BFOQ narrowly.259 For example, in Johnson Controls,
the Court concluded that an employer cannot use sex classifications to
substitute its judgment about personal safety for that of the employ-
ees.260 The Court rejected any justification for the exclusion of female
employees from the battery assembly line other than the employee’s
ability to perform the job.261 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that an
employee’s sex must actually interfere with the employee’s ability to
perform the job.262 Similarly, a coach or athletic program would not
be able to use sex classifications as a basis for excluding a female
player from a sport with inherent risks and dangers. A female ath-
lete’s decision to participate in a male contact sport with inherent risks
of injury should be no different than a male athlete’s decision. More
importantly, it should be her decision to assume the risk.
Additionally, the safety rationale would not satisfy the BFOQ if it is
not based on objective sports-related requirements. Here, the safety
255. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197, 203.
256. Id. at 201.
257. Id. at 204.
258. See supra Section III.A.1.
259. Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200–01 (1991).
260. Id. at 199 (finding employer was inappropriately discriminating when he banned women
from working on a battery assembly line because of the potential exposure of lead to a develop-
ing fetus).
261. Id. at 206.
262. Id. at 204.
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rationale behind the contact sport exception is founded on the stere-
otypical perception that male athletes are stronger than female ath-
letes rather than an individualized consideration of the female athlete.
The Court in Dothard stated that “it is impermissible under Title VII
to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of stereo-
typed characterizations of the sexes.”263 Similarly, it would be imper-
missible to refuse to allow a female athlete to try out for a contact
sport based on stereotyped characterizations of the female sex as in-
herently weak and delicate. Under Title VII, “the argument that a
particular job is too dangerous for women may appropriately be met
by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individ-
ual woman to make that choice for herself.”264 Likewise, an argument
that a particular sport is too dangerous for female athletes would ap-
propriately be met by the rejoinder that the purpose of Title IX is to
allow individual students to make the choice for themselves without
the fear of sex discrimination limiting their opportunities. Just as Title
VII protects a woman’s “decision to weigh and accept the risks of em-
ployment,” Title IX protects a woman’s decision to participate in her
chosen educational or athletic opportunity.265
While strength is an essential element of sports, the exclusion of an
entire sex from a sport because its members are stereotypically
weaker than the opposite sex is not justified because strength is not
exclusively based on sex. Just as the employer in Dothard was re-
quired to provide an individualized test for measuring strength di-
rectly to fully satisfy Title VII, an athletic program would be required
to allow female athletes to exhibit their strength and abilities through
an individualized tryout.266 The Court in Dothard required the em-
ployer to provide a test of strength that would measure “the person
for the job and not the person in the abstract.”267 Similarly, an individ-
ualized tryout for a contact sports team would measure the athlete for
the sport and not the athlete in the abstract. Since tryouts are an ac-
ceptable practice for determining the best males for a contact sport,
the same practice should be applied for determining the best females.
b. Third-Party Preference
Additionally, the educational institution may ground its affirmative
defense in the preference of third parties. More specifically, the edu-
263. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 323, 334 (1977).
264. Id. at 335.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 332.
267. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)).
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cational institution may argue that the elimination of female athletes
from male contact sports is necessary to adhere to the preference of
third-party spectators who prefer to watch male athletes compete with
other male athletes without the distraction of female participation.
This reasoning could also be applied to coaches that prefer to coach
male athletes over female athletes.
The court in Diaz addressed a similar third-party preference ratio-
nale. In that case, the employer, Pan American Airlines, had a policy
of excluding males from flight attendant positions because male pas-
sengers preferred the cosmetic benefit of female flight attendants.268
The court rejected this third-party preference rationale because Con-
gress did not intend for the BFOQ to allow an employer to “legiti-
mately discriminate against a group solely because his employees,
customers, or clients discriminated against a group.”269 This would
perpetuate the history of sex discrimination against an under-
represented group. An educational institution would similarly not be
allowed to discriminate against all female athletes simply because
coaches, spectators, and fans discriminate against female athletes. The
educational institution, like the employer in Diaz, would have to show
that all or substantially all female athletes would not be able to play
the contact sport in a safe and efficient manner—which, as shown
above, is currently not the case.270 The educational institution would
need to conduct individualized tryouts to determine whether female
athletes can safely participate in male contact sports. Therefore, the
preference of athletic coaches and spectators would not justify the ex-
clusion of female athletes from male contact sports just as the prefer-
ence of male passengers in Diaz did not justify the exclusion of male
flight attendants from airlines.
Thus, the contact sport exception would not qualify as a BFOQ af-
firmative defense under the safety rationale or the third-party prefer-
ence reasoning because the sex of the athlete does not relate to the
essence of the contact sport. Since the athlete’s sex does not automati-
cally interfere with her ability to play the sport, the exclusion of all or
substantially all female athletes from contact sports is not a BFOQ.
In summation, the contact sport exception would constitute a for-
mal policy of discrimination under Title VII because it is based on
generalized stereotypes about female athletes as a class and does not
focus on the qualifications of the individual. Additionally, the exclu-
sion of all female athletes from contact sports does not directly relate
268. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 (1971).
269. Id. at 387.
270. See supra Sections I.B.2., II.A.
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to the essence or central mission of the contact sport because the sex
of the athlete does not directly interfere with the athlete’s ability to
play the contact sport. For these reasons, the contact sport exception
would be impermissible under Title VII.
3. Pretext
If the BFOQ defenses were accepted, however, the burden would
shift back to the female athlete. She would have to show that the af-
firmative defenses are pretext for the legislature’s intent to protect
revenue-producing sports like men’s football and basketball from fe-
male encroachment. This Section will attack the safety rationale.
The contact sport exception was the result of a congressional com-
promise.271 Male legislators were concerned that a nondiscrimination
mandate would damage college football and men’s basketball by di-
verting funds and support from these sports.272 They believed that
“[t]he contact sports rule could help protect ‘football as we know (and
love) it’ from encroachment by females.”273 The intent behind the
contact sport exception is evidenced by the congressional hearings.274
The Secretary of HEW, Caspar Weinberger, alluded to the contact
sport exception as an accommodation to parties like the NCAA and
Senator Tower who wanted revenue-producing sports excluded from
Title IX entirely.275 More specifically, Weinberger stated:
[w]ith regard to athletics . . . Let’s look first at what the regulation
does not require . . . It does not require women to play football with
men . . . it will not result in the dissolution of athletic programs for
men . . . it does not mean that the National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation (NCAA) will be dissolved . . . .276
By exempting contact sports, the contact sport exception implicitly ex-
empted male-dominated, revenue-producing sports like football and
basketball.277 In this way, the contact sport exception served as a com-
promise to protect strong lobbying groups like the NCAA.
According to the contact sport exception in Title IX, a contact sport
is one in which the “purpose” or “major activity” of the sport is con-
271. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text.
272. Id.
273. George, supra note 17, at 1129.
274. Sex Discrimination Regulations, Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Post-Secon-
dary Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 438 (1975), at
438 [hereinafter Weinberger statement] (statement of Caspar W. Weinberger, Sec. of Dep’t of
Health, Educ., & Welfare).
275. Weinberger statement, supra note 274.
276. Id. at 439.
277. Demery, supra note 5, at 383.
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tact.278 The regulation enumerates a list of contact sports, including
basketball, a game in which the purpose is not necessarily contact.279
Although contact may be inevitable in basketball, the extent of the
contact and the need for contact does not reach the level of sports like
football and hockey. In fact, unnecessary contact in basketball is
against the rules and constitutes a foul.280 The questionable inclusion
of basketball on the list of contact sports bolsters the assumption that
the regulation was created to protect sports from female encroach-
ment rather than to protect females from physical harm or danger.281
The origin of the contact sport exception, therefore, was not to protect
female athletes from harm. Rather, the legislative intent behind the
contact sport exception was to protect the revenue-producing institu-
tions of football and basketball.
For these reasons, the safety rationale would be considered pretext
for the intent to protect revenue-producing sports from female en-
croachment and would not constitute a sufficient defense to retain the
contact sport exception.
III. IMPACT
A. Applicability of Cross-Statutory Analysis in the Changing
Sports Law Climate
This Comment has both a theoretical and practical impact. The
analysis of the contact sport exception under Title VII’s disparate
treatment analysis is a theoretical contribution to the academic dis-
course surrounding the rescission of the contact sport exception from
Title IX.282 It provides another basis for why the contact sport excep-
tion is unconstitutional. This analysis could, however, become practi-
cal if student athletes are deemed employees by either Congress or
the federal court system. Although this has yet to occur,283 the recent
278. 34 C.F.R § 106.41(b) (2000).
279. § 106.41(b).
280. George, supra note 17, at 1129.
281. Id.
282. See generally Demery, supra note 5; Brown, supra note 9; George, supra note 17; Dennis,
supra note 39; Matthews, supra note 62; Furman, supra note 228; Chapple, supra note 227; Jes-
sica E. Jay, Women’s Participation in Sports: Four Feminist Perspectives, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
(1997); Robert T. Zielinski, College Athletes as Employees, 41 J.C. & U.L. 71 (2015); Justin C.
Vine, Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes Are Employees of Their University, 12 CAR-
DOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 235 (2013); Omar A. Bareentto, NCAA, It’s Time to Pay the
Piper: The Aftermath of O’bannon v. NCAA and Northwestern v. College Athletes Players As-
sociation, 12 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 1 (2015); Reinbrecht, supra note 238.
283. See Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (1983) (The court held
that a student was not an employee of the university for the purpose of the state’s workers’
compensation act. The court noted that the agreements between the student and the university
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case Northwestern University v. College Athletes Players Association284
and the rise of state legislation permitting the compensation of stu-
dent athletes for their “name, image and likeness”285 may result in the
employment status of student athletes. If student athletes become em-
ployees of their educational institutions, then they could potentially
utilize the above statutory analysis under Title VII to combat the con-
tact sport exception of Title IX as an unconstitutional policy of sexual
discrimination.286
In fact, the argument by female student athletes to rescind the con-
tact sport exception under Title VII could even be bolstered by these
new name, image, and likeness laws. The student athletes that will
benefit from these name, image, and likeness compensation laws will
be predominately male football and basketball players because they
are the ones that receive the most publicity and commercial attention.
The contact sport exception’s restriction of female athletes from these
revenue-producing sports, therefore, not only restricts their opportu-
nity to gain mental, physical, and emotional benefits, it restricts their
access to the compensation now accessible under the name, image,
did not disclose the requisite intent of either party to enter into an employee-employer relation-
ship.); Coleman v. W. Michigan Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (1983) (The Michigan Court of Appeals
applied the economic realities test and held that a student athlete is not an employee under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.); Waldrep v. Texas Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000) (Texas Court of Appeals declared that a student athlete could not be considered an em-
ployee and could not be awarded workers’ compensation because the NCAA rules of eligibility
require amateurism status.). See generally Zielinski, supra note 282; Vine, supra note 282.
284. Nw. Univ. I, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014) (This case held that grant-
in-aid scholarship football players at Northwestern are employees under the National Labor
Relations Act.). See generally Bareentto, supra note 282; Reinbrecht, supra note 238.
285. While none of these state laws currently allow a student athlete to get paid directly from
the institutions, it is a possibility. If that happens, these students can be categorized as employees
and, in turn, be able to utilize the Title VII framework provided here to combat the contact sport
exception. See California Fair Pay to Play Act, S.B. 206, 2019-20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2019); H.B.
3904, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); S.B. 0660, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019);
H.B. 5217, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019); H.B. 1564, 100th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2020); H.B. 1792, 100th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2020); H.B. 1748, 100th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2020); S.B. 582, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2020); S.B. 646, 2019
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); H.B. 251, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2020); H.B. 287, 2019 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2020); H.B. 743, 2019-20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2020); H.B. 3347, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2020); S.B. 935, 2019-20 Leg., 123rd Sess. (S.C. 2019); H.B. 4973, 2019-20 Leg., 123rd Sess.
(S.C. 2020); H.B. 1694, S.B. 1636, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2020); H.B. 1710, S.B. 1767,
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2020). The NCAA has also proposed a bill to Congress to
establish national uniformity regarding the compensation for student athletes’ name, image and
likeness. Student-Athlete Equity Act, H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. (2019-2020); see also Name, Image,
and Likeness: The State of Intercollegiate Athlete Compensation: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Manufacturing, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 115th Cong. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www
.commerce.senate.gov/2020/2/name-image-and-likeness-the-state-of-intercollegiate-athlete-
compensation.
286. This only applies to college student athletes.
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and likeness laws. By restricting participation for females, this could
lead to a disparate impact on their ability to access revenues from
their name, image and likeness, because if women cannot at least try
out for the men’s football or basketball teams, then they have no abil-
ity to access the highest revenue-generating sports. Therefore, the
name, image, and likeness laws serve as a new benefit to male student
athletes, a benefit that female student athletes are prevented from
utilizing because of the contact sport exception in Title IX. Female
student athletes, if deemed employees, will be able to utilize this Com-
ment’s Title VII analysis to combat the discriminatory effects of the
contact sport exception under both the systemic disparate treatment
analysis and potentially the disparate impact analysis.
B. Physical, Mental, and Social Benefits Associated with
Participation in Sports
This Comment is not just an intellectual exercise. It is important to
understand why expanding female participation in athletics really
matters. Participation in sports and physical exercise provides various
health benefits to athletes including disease prevention and increased
mental wellness.287 Additionally, sports instill important life skills like
discipline, respect, and teamwork that continue to benefit athletes in
their academic, professional, and political lives.288 A Nike advertise-
ment from 1995 illustrates the impact sports can have on young girls:
If you let me play, if you let me play sports. I will like myself more; I
will have more self-confidence. If you let me play sports. If you let
me play, I will be sixty percent less likely to get breast cancer; I will
suffer less depression. If you let me play sports, I will be more likely
to leave a man who beats me. If you let me play, I will be less likely
to get pregnant before I want. I will learn what it means to be
strong, if you let me play.289
The girls in this advertisement are sitting on the sidelines begging the
world to let them play sports while the boys are playing catch on the
nearby playground.290 The image suggests a parallel to Heather Mer-
cer, a strong, capable female kicker sidelined by a coach’s stereotypi-
cal assumptions regarding a woman’s role in the world of sports.291
287. Nancy Leong & Emily Bartlett, Sex Segregation in Sports as a Public Health Issue, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 1813, 1823–36 (2019); 12 Benefits of Sports Participation for Women, WOMEN
FITNESS MAGAZINE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.womenfitnessmag.com/12-benefits-of-sports-
participation-for-women/ [hereinafter WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE]; Jay, supra note 282.
288. WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE, supra note 287; Jay, supra note 282, at 15.
289. If You Let Me Play (Nike commercial broadcast Oct. 3, 1995).
290. Id.
291. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
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These images illustrate that girls are strong, but sidelined by the
world’s refusal to let them play sports. While Title IX has provided
some progress in this area, the contact sport exception continues to
exclude women from contact sports and perpetuates the assumption
that women are second-class athletes. The presence of negative cul-
tural and social biases against female athletes coupled with the sex
segregation embedded in the contact sport exception discourages
young women and girls from participating in sports entirely. In fact,
almost half of the girls between the ages of three and seventeen do not
participate in sports.292 To encourage female participation in athletics
and to provide females with an equal opportunity to reap the physical,
mental and social benefits associated with playing sports, sex segrega-
tion—specifically the contact sport exception—must be eliminated.
The physical and sexual health benefits associated with participa-
tion in sports greatly affect women and girls. Some physical health
benefits include: heart health, weight management, lower blood pres-
sure, balanced cholesterol levels, enhanced immunity, diabetes con-
trol, and cancer prevention.293 Preventing cardiovascular disease is
particularly helpful to female athletes because it is the leading cause
of death among women.294 Similarly, breast cancer prevention is par-
ticularly important for young women and girls because breast cancer
is the second-leading cancer-related cause of death among women.295
One study showed that “physical activity was especially potent in
preventing estrogen receptor-positive breast cancer, a type of cancer
that tends to occur in younger women and tends to be more aggressive
and fatal.”296 Additionally, participation in athletics cuts the risk of
colon cancer among women in half.297 Athletic participation can also
improve sexual health.298 One study found that adolescent girls who
participate in sports are less likely to have unwanted pregnancies or
be treated for sexually transmitted diseases in high school.299 Adoles-
cent female athletes are more likely to use birth control, seek profes-
sional health advice regarding sex, and undergo a gynecological
examination.300
292. WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE, supra note 287.
293. Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287, at 1823–27; WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE, supra note
287; Jay, supra note 282, at 10–11.
294. Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287, at 1823; WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE, supra note 287.
295. Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287, at 1824.
296. Id. at 1826.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1827–28; Jay, supra note 282, at 12.
299. Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287, at 1828; Jay, supra note 282, at 12.
300. Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287, at 1828.
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Participation in athletics can also improve an athlete’s mental
health.301 Some mental health benefits include increased self-esteem
and reduced risk of depression, suicide, and eating disorders.302 Sports
allow female athletes an opportunity to develop a “sense of apprecia-
tion” for their bodies.303 One study noted that sports provide female
athletes with “an empowering alternative to the conventional script of
passive femininity” by encouraging them “to redefine their own bod-
ies as tools for their own use rather than as objects of others’ de-
sire.”304 These feelings of empowerment result in positive body image,
increased self-confidence and self-esteem, and can often prevent eat-
ing disorders.305 Additionally, continued participation in athletics de-
crease current and future risks of depression among women.306 In fact,
female college athletes reported a one-third reduction in medically di-
agnosed depression when compared to their non-athlete female
peers.307
There are several social benefits associated with participating in
sports as well. The structure of sports encourages discipline, respect,
teamwork, and overall character development.308 In some sports, the
team-based outlook instills healthy relationships with teammates, op-
ponents, and authority figures—such as coaches, captains, and refer-
ees.309 Individual sports, as well as team-based sports, foster the
development of the discipline needed to cooperate and follow the
rules of the sport as well as the discipline needed to improve the indi-
vidual athlete and the team by working towards an objective.310 The
perseverance inspired in athletes after a difficult loss further develops
their character and instills a competitive drive. These social benefits,
as well as the mental and physical benefits, influence an athlete’s aca-
demic and professional lives. For example, students who participate in
sports receive higher grades and are more likely to graduate from high
301. Id. at 1830–36; WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE, supra note 287; Jay, supra note 282, at
12–14.
302. Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287, at 1830–36; WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE, supra note
287; Jay, supra note 282, at 12–14.
303. Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287, at 1831.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1834–36 (Please note, however, that some sports may increase the likelihood of
developing an eating disorder. For example, sports like gymnastics and track that focus on the
leanness of an athlete’s body may result in body image issues and eating disorders.). See also Jay,
supra note 282, at 14.
306. Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287, at 1832.
307. Id. at 1833.
308. WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE, supra note 287; Jay, supra note 282, at 13.
309. WOMEN FITNESS MAGAZINE, supra note 287.
310. Id.
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school and college.311 Additionally, student athletes have a greater
chance at pursuing and excelling in competitive jobs because they
learn the values of teamwork, leadership, competition, and effective
communication through sports.312 In fact, “[e]ighty percent of women
identified as key leaders in Fortune 500 companies participate[d] in
sports during their childhood.”313
The participation in contact sports with the opposite sex could po-
tentially expand and extend these benefits. For example, a female ath-
lete that plays against or with male athletes learns from a young age
that she is strong enough to participate in this male-dominated world
of sports. Similarly, the professional world is dominated by men, and
female athletes who participated in contact sports with male athletes
will have the self-confidence and competitive skills to fight for their
place at the accounting firm, in the medical field, or at the courthouse.
Some authors even “assert that competitive sports supply the first
stage of pre-law training” because law school and law in practice are a
“contest played within a very complex set of rules with clear winners
and losers, not unlike any competitive sport.”314
The contact sport exception and other forms of sex segregation in
sports prevent women and girls from experiencing these physical,
mental, social, and professional benefits associated with sports. This in
turn, places women several steps behind men in their athletic, aca-
demic, professional, and political lives. The contact sport exception
also tells girls that they are physically inferior to boys because they
lack some athletic ability.315 This creates a stigmatic harm and sports
become a reminder of female inferiority, rather than a source of em-
powerment, self-esteem, and positive character development.316 The
damaging psychological experience of exclusion affects other areas of
women’s lives as well because “[g]irls who see themselves as unfit to
play sports with boys will grow into women who may see themselves
as unable to compete with men in other areas: academically, profes-
sionally, and politically.”317 In order to allow young women and girls
the equal opportunity to derive the positive physical, mental, and so-
cial benefits associated with participation in sports, the contact sport
exception and other forms of sex segregation in athletics must be re-
311. Id. at 15.
312. Jay, supra note 282, at 15.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 16.
315. See generally Leong & Bartlett, supra note 287.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1846.
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moved. Such a removal will allow women to compete for their spot on
the field, in the courtroom, and at the table.
CONCLUSION
The contact sport exception should be eliminated from Title IX to
effectuate the purpose of Title IX—providing equal opportunity for
females in education and educational activities. Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the contact sport exception is unconstitutional because
the complete exclusion of females from contact sports is not substan-
tially related to the important governmental interest of protecting the
safety of athletes.318 When applying the systemic disparate treatment
analysis of Title VII to the contact sport exception of Title IX, the
contact sport exception would constitute an illegal policy of discrimi-
nation based on sex because the policy relies on generalized stereo-
types and assumptions about women as a class instead of allowing for
individualized consideration of the qualifications of each athlete.319
The safety rationale asserted by Congress and supporters of the con-
tact sport exception does not qualify as a BFOQ under Title VII be-
cause an athlete’s sex would not directly interfere with her ability to
participate in the contact sport and, therefore, sex is not related to the
essence of the sport.320 For these reasons, the legislature must elimi-
nate the contact sport exception to provide female athletes with an
equal opportunity to participate in contact sports through individual-
ized tryouts.
Opening the football gates and gymnasium doors gives young girls
the opportunity to grow and develop intellectually, emotionally, and
physically. Rescinding the contact sport exception will level the play-
ing field both in the athletic arena and in the professional world. It
will teach these female athletes that they are not second-class any-
thing; that they can get off the sidelines and show the world their
strength. If you let them play, they will show you their worth.
Katlynn Dee
318. See supra Section II.A.
319. See supra Section II.B.1.
320. See supra Sections II.B.2., II.B.3.
